The devastating fire on Dalston Lane on 5 June 2024 led to the destruction of dozens of our neighbours’ homes. They do not know when they will ever be able to return. The support that they have received from Peabody has been inconsistent, and in many cases has made their experiences significantly worse.
On 8 January 2025 we filed a complaint about Peabody’s handling of the Dalston Lane fire. You can find a copy here.
Peabody were due to respond by 12 February 2025, but failed to do so. Their “Stage 1 Response” only arrived on 24 March 2025. The response failed to engage with the complaint, to provide compensation to the affected residents, or to commit to any improvements in future. You can find a copy here.
Today, 28 March 2025, the Residents’ Association has lodged a Stage 2 complaint escalation. A copy is below.
CAS-1328677-Y1F6S2 Escalation to Stage 2
I write to request the escalation to Stage 2 of complaint CAS-1328677-Y1F6S2. The complaint relates to the unacceptable treatment of Dalston Lane residents after the fire on 5 June 2024. The Stage 1 Response was sent on 24 March 2025. This escalation is lodged on 28 March 2025. Do not call me about this response. I want all correspondence to be done in writing over email via chair@pemburyestate.com.
Failure to set out timescales correctly
The Stage 1 Response gives a “logged” date of 29 January 2025.
However, the complaint was initially filed with Peabody on 8 January 2025. Peabody then refused to accept the complaint, because it was submitted by our Joint Chair Dr Elizabeth Houghton, who is a resident but “not listed as the main resident or as having Third Party Authority on [their] property”. This is despite the Peabody complaints policy stating complaints can be lodged by “any individual or group affected by the services Peabody provides”. That refusal to accept the complaint, in defiance of Peabody’s own policy, is unacceptable. It forms part of complaint CAS-1320720-W8B7P8 filed under Dr Houghton’s name.
I then re-lodged this complaint on 20 January 2025 in order to ensure that Peabody dealt with it. The complaint was co-signed by multiple Dalston Lane residents. Peabody was due to acknowledge it by 27 January 2025. It was not acknowledged until 29 January 2025. That delay in even acknowledging the complaint is unexplained and unacceptable.
Assuming that the date of acknowledgment is then taken for producing a latest date for a Stage 1 Response in line with Peabody’s Complaints Policy, that gave a deadline of 12 February 2025. That deadline was not complied with. The latest date for an extended deadline for the Stage 1 Response pursuant to the Complaints Policy was 26 February 2025. That deadline was also not complied with. Instead, a Stage 1 Response was sent 26 days after the latest day for compliance with the extended deadline. That delay is explained in the Stage 1 Response as being due to there being “multiple points [meaning] it has taken a little longer to collate all of the necessary information”. That is not a credible explanation, given that no new information was provided in the Stage 1 Response.
Failure to engage with the complaint
(1) Fire Risk Assessments
At the outset, I must make clear that we take issue with the use of language in the Stage 1 Response. The Stage 1 response asserts that the basis of this part of the complaint is that “You have highlighted what you feel are inaccuracies in an FRA carried out in July 2023.” We did not highlight something we felt was inaccurate: the FRA included false statements that we set out in our complaint letter. Those false statements have been reported in the media. We also set out the background of Peabody keeping in force FRAs in Atkins Square which their directors know to contain false statements. The Stage 1 Response fails to accept the truth of the situation. The wording of the Stage 1 Response – which appears to seek to avoid responsibility for Peabody’s actions – may be perceived as adding to the offence caused by the actions of Peabody.
The Stage 1 Response in asserts “We have been open with residents about the mistake with the previous report.” We are aware of no ways in which Peabody has been open with residents about mistakes in the FRA. In what ways has Peabody been open about this?
We sought an outcome to this particular aspect of the complaint as follows:
“Peabody to disclose to all residents on the Pembury Estate as a matter of course the Fire Risk Assessments for their blocks, so that these can be checked for accuracy by residents. This does not mean providing a “summary”, such as that currently provided, which is entirely inadequate to make such judgments as it does not provide the necessary detail to assess accuracy.”
This was sought on the basis that Peabody keeps producing FRAs which they know to contain false and misleading information.
This outcome we sought is dismissed in the Stage 1 Response as follows:
“We share summaries of these FRAs with residents, so we are not sharing any property or resident-specific information into the public domain.”
This dismissal is based on premises that Peabody know to be false.
Firstly, we have seen (inadequate) FRAs for Atkins Square. We know that they do not contain resident-specific information. There could be no risk of a data breach by sharing the FRAs for the building.
Secondly, the only “property-specific” information would relate to the block, not individual flats. This is exactly the information that we would need to see in order to assess the accuracy of the FRA.
Thirdly, if for any unforeseen reason a FRA contained information that related to an individual or individual flat, it could be redacted and only sent to the individual or flat concerned.
Fourthly, we are not referring to releasing information into the public domain. We are referring to sending FRAs to residents of the individual blocks to which the FRAs relate. Peabody already send information about blocks to residents of those same blocks. This is no different.
Fifthly, it fails to acknowledge the fact that there are defects in FRAs, and we have a way of fixing them by involving residents.
We are very concerned that the explanation for why Peabody do not want to share FRAs with residents is that Peabody know that the FRAs are replete with inaccuracies. Every single FRA that our members have obtained from Peabody has contained fundamental errors which make them worthless. While this may be an embarrassment for Peabody, the embarrassment of Peabody executives attending to give evidence at the inquests of its residents who burn to death in their homes following the provision of inadequate FRAs will be considerably greater.
We ask that Peabody give residents the FRAs for their own homes, or give us an honest reason why Peabody will not do so.
(2) Peabody causing delays into the LFB report on the fire
In our complaint we set out that the London Fire Brigade had informed us that the delay to publishing the report on the cause of the fire is, in part, because they are waiting for Peabody’s insurer to confirm a date to release evidence samples to be scientifically examined by independent experts. We asked Peabody to explain what Peabody was doing to work with their insurer to confirm a time with the LFB, and to explain why this was taking so long.
In the Stage 1 Response Peabody say that they have cooperated fully and promptly with the LFB. That flatly contradicts what the LFB have informed us.
Who is telling the truth, the London Fire Brigade, or Peabody?
We note here that Peabody have provided no detail on the steps that Peabody have taken to ensure that they and their insurer cooperate with the LFB. We assume this is because the provision of a detailed timeline of all the steps that were taken would show that Peabody or their insurer were the cause of some delay.
If that is not the case, we are certain that Peabody will respond to this Stage 2 escalation with a detailed timeline that can be cross-referenced with the LFB. Otherwise, we can only assume that this is an admission of liability on the part of Peabody that they or their insurer are in fact the cause of the delay.
(3) Failure to provide stable temporary accommodation
In our complaint we made clear the serious failures on the part of Peabody which left residents at risk of eviction from their temporary accommodation. Residents have repeatedly been made aware that their temporary accommodation has not been extended because Peabody have failed to take the necessary actions to extend the accommodation. Accommodation has only then been extended because of the intervention of external support services such as our MP, Meg Hillier, who has had to contact the CEO’s office to seek a resolution.
The Stage 1 Response gives a positive spin on this failure to renew accommodation in good time: “This has allowed us to be flexible and avoid costs for hotels and apartments when they were no longer needed, which is why we cannot always extend bookings 28 days in advance.” We note that the focus by Peabody is on cost-saving, rather than on decent treatment of residents.
The Stage 1 Response asserts that on a mere “small number of occasions” “residents have experienced some confusion” about whether they were about to be evicted. Contrary to this assertion, residents did not “experience some confusion”. They were set to be evicted. They were not confused about this. Their evictions were specifically because of Peabody’s failure to renew their accommodation. That followed Peabody’s failure to provide them somewhere safe to live and not expose them to the risk of being burnt to death in their own homes. If Peabody require from the people affected first-person evidence of the issue of residents being on the verge of eviction, it can be produced, though we note that Peabody did not request such evidence at the Stage 1 Response stage.
Nowhere has Peabody adequately accepted responsibility or outlined how these “one offs” that “should not” happen (these being quotes from Peabody staff we set out in our complaint) were allowed to happen, and will be prevented from being repeated.
We set out below how the statement in the Stage 1 Response that “We’re sorry for the inconvenience and frustration this caused” is inadequate. We further set out below how the assertion that “we are unable to offer the £500 compensation you have requested” is false.
(4) Failure to appropriately pay expenses for residents
In our complaint we made clear the following:
“In the immediate aftermath of the fire, displaced residents received inconsistent information regarding emergency expenses by NMs [Neighbourhood Managers]. This resulted in some residents being compensated for emergency provisions, such as purchasing changes of clothes, while others were not. This is both unfair and calls into question Peabody’s ability to communicate and follow its own policies.”
The Stage 1 Response begins on this topic by referring to claiming for items destroyed or damaged in the fire. This is not what this part of the complaint relates to: everyone was evacuated with only the clothes on their backs, and needed to make emergency purchases. This is not a matter of items destroyed or damaged in the fire, but rather the immediate needs of people displaced from their homes.
The Stage 1 Response appears to suggest that only one resident was ever compensated for emergency provisions, or told that they would be.
Firstly, this is false. Multiple residents were told that they would be compensated. Not all that were told that they would be compensated for emergency provisions have been compensated.
Secondly, it fails to engage with the complaint on this point at all.
Further, the complaint response appears to suggest that our demand for £1,000 compensation per resident relates to this alone. It does not. It relates to the sum total of Peabody’s failures. We did not link a specific demand for compensation to this issue, and we do not understand why it has been so linked in the Stage 1 Response.
(5) Lack of support from Neighbourhood Managers
In our complaint on this issue we firstly took issue with Peabody’s false claim to have provided “dedicated” Neighbourhood Managers (“NMs”). We secondly took issue with Peabody’s failure to adequately alter the workload of NMs supporting displaced residents to allow them to provide required support. We thirdly took issue with the inconsistent approaches of different NMs.
The Stage 1 Response fails to even engage with any of these issues.
The Stage 1 Response does however assert that Peabody’s approach “generally worked well”. This is not the assessment of the residents affected. Who made this assessment that Peabody’s approach regarding NMs “generally worked well”?
The Stage 1 Response goes on to allege that “All our Neighbourhood Managers […] have been available to help residents of Dalston Lane.” In making this assertion, is Peabody asserting that the facts we set out in our complaint regarding the unavailability of NMs are untrue?
(6) The issues to which the above background gives rise
In our complaint we said as follows:
“It is entirely unjustifiable that the issues set out above are ongoing. Peabody has been aware of all of these issues for several months. As set out at the outset of this complaint, these issues show (1) the failure of appropriate governance across Peabody, leading to the unacceptable lack of support or care for these displaced residents; (2) failures by Peabody staff to follow policy or put in place any form of business continuity; (3) failures by Peabody to follow its legal obligations regarding fire safety; and (4) the continued delay in investigating and disclosing the cause of the fire.
The entirety of these matters call into question the ability of the Board to competently manage the Trust, and the fitness of Board members to act in their roles. The Board is failing in its duties to manage the Trust competently by allowing systemic failures to arise in the delivery of services to the most vulnerable of residents. If the Board has been aware of these issues then they have failed to act on them; if until now they have been unaware of these issues then they have failed to exercise effective oversight of staff. Either way, neither residents, nor regulators, should be able to have confidence in the Board’s ability to manage the Trust if it fails to address not just the specific issues raised in this complaint, but the systemic issues which underlie them.”
None of this has been dealt with in the Stage 1 Response. Instead, Peabody asserts that “Peabody has been working hard to help and support residents…” That is not a response to the issues raised. We raised serious issues about the failures of governance on the part of Peabody. The failure to respond to them speaks volumes about the lack of seriousness with which Peabody is treating this issue.
Ongoing harm and distress
It is important to the context of this complaint to understand how traumatic the fire was for the residents of Dalston Lane, which has been significantly worsened by the treatment they have received from Peabody since. On the day of the fire, residents had to flee with nothing put the clothes on their back. Many have lost everything. It is only by sheer luck that there were no fatalities. Residents have spoken about the ‘nightmare’ of the fire and their experiences after to the press (https://www.hackneycitizen.co.uk/2025/02/14/families-displaced-dalston-fire-hit-out-landlord-lack-support/).
Peabody’s approach continuously fails to acknowledge this trauma. This is evident in the tone-deaf response and mealymouthed apology. In the response, Peabody is quick to congratulate itself on how it handled the aftermath of the fire, but this is entirely at odds with how residents have felt. Residents have frequently had to ask their MP to intervene in order for their trauma to be taken seriously. Fire victims should not have to do this. They have had to share amongst themselves contradictory information and advice from different neighbourhood managers, to try and understand what they are entitled to. Fire victims should not have to do this. They have had repeated stress of not being to contact their assigned neighbourhood managers, and threats of evictions, sometimes only being resolved on the day – again, after the MP’s intervention. Fire victims should not have to experience this.
Peabody’s abject failure in any duty of care for the residents has also caused concern across the wider estate, who fear they would be similarly mistreated if they lost their homes. Peabody’s response does nothing to suggest that adequate lessons have been learnt to prevent a repeat.
It leaves all residents wondering if a fire has to be fatal for Peabody to take this issue seriously. And many doubt they would even then.
Failure to apply compensation policy
Apology
The complaint outcome partially upheld the complaint because we “highlighted instances where residents have reported receiving poor service from some colleagues”. An apology is then given for that.
Notably, this fails to even accept that poor service was in fact delivered. What is being accepted, and apologised for, appears to be that residents reported receiving poor service.
Peabody’s Compensation and Remedies Policy at paragraph 4.2 provides that putting things right involves “A sincere apology, in writing, verbally or in person, taking full responsibility for the service failure and acknowledging the impact on the resident.” That is missing from the Stage 1 Response.
£1,000 compensation per affected resident
What should plainly be accepted is that serious disruption was caused to our members over a significant period of time by Peabody’s multiple service failures. Compensation of “£1,000 plus is envisaged” by Peabody’s Compensation and Remedies Policy for such a failure. We attempted to take a reasonable approach by pitching our request for compensation at the lowest end of that scale. That is the minimum that should be paid in the light of the service failures.
£500 compensation if issues arise again
In our complaint we requested that where there were further failures to inform residents of the confirmation of their extension of stay in good time, or reasonable notice of the end of their stay, £500 compensation would be awarded without the need for further complaints.
In the Stage 1 Response Peabody assert that they are “unable to offer the £500 compensation you have requested”. No reason is given for this. There is no basis in the Compensation and Remedies Policy for this assertion. Indeed, £500 compensation would be easily in line with the Compensation and Remedies Policy’s guidance on compensation for disruption.
We asked for this commitment to no-quibble further compensation in the event of further service failures both to discourage such further failures, and to ensure that our members are compensated when such failures do occur without being strung along in a months’ long process. We assume from the unreasoned refusal to commit to this outcome, which would only lead to costs for Peabody if there were further service failures, that Peabody expects to make such further service failures, and to drag our members through yet more extended complaints processes.
Complaint handling
Peabody has failed to apply its policy on compensation for complaint handling.
Peabody’s Compensation and Remedies Policy provides as follows:
“4.24 Any resident pursuing a complaint with us will inevitably incur a certain amount of time, trouble and minor costs (such as phone calls). We do not compensate residents for reasonable time and trouble in making a complaint. We will consider payments when the time and trouble in pursuing a complaint is more than would reasonably be expected. This could be due to us not following our complaints procedure, unreasonably delaying in recording, responding to or escalating a complaint, not responding to reasonable communication and demonstrating overall poor complaint handling. We assess compensation remedies based on the following scales:
”
In the present case, as we set out above, Peabody failed to comply with its Complaints Policy. Indeed, this failure is an extensive failure to follow the policy, even setting inside the absolute failure in the complaint response to investigate the complaint correctly. This has caused significant further inconvenience to me individually, my fellow officers in the Residents’ Association, and to the individual co-signatories of the complaint. It has been necessary to set out the failures at each stage of the complaint process in this excruciating detail.
Appropriate compensation under “Serious Failure” should have been paid in the Stage 1 Response.
Conclusion
In conclusion, none of our complaint has actually been dealt with. We require the Stage 2 complaint handler to review the entirety of the complaint from the outset, and provide the full set of remedies we initially sought. We also require the Stage 2 complaint handler to allocate appropriate compensation for the failure to deal with this complaint properly. Finally, we expect this matter to be escalated to the CEO’s office and be placed in front of the Board.
Chloe Campbell